2027: The North Holds the Ace, Tinubu Faces the Test

Olawale Olaleye

Finally, the die is cast. January 16, 2027, like the 2023 presidential run, promises another three-way electoral battle.

And, as the countdown gathers momentum, the major political parties are already assembling their campaign machinery, preparing for what could become one of the most consequential presidential contests in Nigeria’s recent history.

Last Wednesday, October 14, the ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) inaugurated its Presidential Campaign Council, drawing membership not only from its ranks but also from prominent figures in opposition parties, who have thrown their weight behind President Bola Tinubu’s re-election bid.

Five days earlier, on Friday, October 9, the African Democratic Congress (ADC), had inaugurated its own campaign council for former Vice-President Atiku Abubakar.

The third major contender, the Nigeria Democratic Congress (NDC), which is fielding the Peter Obi-Rabiu Kwankwaso ticket, has scheduled the inauguration of its campaign council for tomorrow, Tuesday, October 20, barring any last-minute changes.

But beyond the elaborate ceremonies, curious membership lists, political endorsements and familiar declarations of confidence lies a more fundamental question: where will the election be won or lost?

For all the political intrigues playing out across the country, the answer may lie substantially in the North, a region whose electoral strength was central to Tinubu’s 2023 victory but whose political disposition towards his re-election bid has become an increasingly important subject of debate.

Indeed, if the unfolding political developments are anything to go by, the contest for the North may well be the defining battle of 2027.

Thus, with more than 54 million registered voters across its 19 states, the North remains central to Nigeria’s presidential calculations. Next year’s presidential election is no different.

But can President Tinubu retain the region’s support amid Atiku’s challenge, the Obi- Kwankwaso alliance and the growing scrutiny of his administration’s record?

The region that supplied nearly two-thirds of President Tinubu’s votes in 2023 is confronting a different political reality ahead of the January 16, 2027 presidential poll. 

Between Atiku’s northern credentials, Obi’s alliance with Kwankwaso, the politics of defections, economic hardship and the president’s formidable machinery, the contest for the North could determine whether Tinubu wins another four years or becomes a one-term president.

There is something instructive about the renewed political activity in northern Nigeria. From Kano to Katsina, Sokoto to Zamfara, Kaduna to Borno, and across the North-Central states, politicians who ordinarily would have waited until the closing stages of an election to show their hands are already making their positions known.

Some are openly mobilising for President Tinubu. Others are strengthening alliances with Atiku, a former vice-president, while a third force is emerging from the rather intriguing partnership between Obi, a former Anambra State governor and Kwankwaso, also a former governor of Kano State.

The activity is hardly accidental. Beneath the endorsements, defections, consultations and increasingly familiar assurances of electoral victory hides an uncomfortable truth: the battle for the presidency in 2027 may be decided substantially by what happens in the North.

For Tinubu, the significance is particularly compelling.

In 2023, his victory was built on a coalition that combined the electoral strengths of the South-West with the considerable political structure and goodwill associated with the late former president, Muhammadu Buhari, in the North. 

It was an arrangement whose origins could be traced to the alliance-building that produced the All Progressives Congress (APC) and its historic victory in 2015. But four years in politics is already looking like eternity.

The political goodwill that helped Tinubu secure northern support in 2023 is not necessarily transferable to 2027. 

This time, he must defend his own record, explain the consequences of his economic policies, answer questions about the distribution of political power and convince a region struggling with insecurity and economic pressures that another four years would serve its interests.

He must do so against a fellow northerner in Atiku and an Obi-Kwankwaso ticket that could introduce an entirely different dimension to northern voting behaviour.

The question, therefore, is no longer merely whether Tinubu can win the North. He did not win a majority of its states in 2023, yet secured the presidency.

The more far-reaching question is whether he can retain enough northern votes to prevent his national electoral coalition from unravelling. And the numbers explain why.

The Mathematics of Power: 

2023 Versus 2027

According to the Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), Nigeria entered the 2023 presidential election with 93,469,008 registered voters. The latest reported register, released in October 2026 ahead of the January 16, 2027 presidential election, contains 103,428,715 registered voters.

That represents an increase of 9,959,707 voters, or approximately 10.66 per cent.

More strikingly, the North, comprising the North-West, North-East and North-Central geopolitical zones, including the Federal Capital Territory, accounts for 56,014,673 registered voters. That is approximately 54.16 per cent of the national register.

Excluding the FCT, the 19 northern states alone have 54,282,630 registered voters. In 2023, their combined register stood at approximately 48.59 million.

In other words, the northern states have added about 5.69 million registered voters since the last presidential election. The regional breakdown is revealing.

In North-West, the 2023 registered voters were 22,255,562 and they rose to 25,083,411 in 2026 while Tinubu garnered 2,652,235 votes in 2023.

North-East had 12,542,429 voters in 2023 and by 2026, they had risen to 13,965,475. Yet, Tinubu had 1,185,458 votes in 2023 from the zone.

The North-Central, however, excluding the FCT, boasted 13,793,424 in 2023 and as of last year, it has in its kitty, 15,233,744 registered voters. Tinubu had 1,670,091 votes from this number in 2023.

Over all, the 19 northern states had 48,591,415 in 2023 and by 2026, the number was 54,282,630. But across the states, Tinubu only polled 5,507,784 votes in 2023.

These numbers establish two important points. First, the North-West, with more than 25 million registered voters, is the country’s largest geopolitical electoral bloc. Its register alone exceeds those of the North-East and South-East combined.

Second, Tinubu’s dependence on northern votes in 2023 was enormous. Of the 8,794,726 votes that he received nationally, approximately 5,507,784 came from the 19 northern states. That translates to about 62.6 per cent of his total votes.

The figure is significant enough without exaggeration. It also reveals a political irony. Tinubu won only seven of the 19 northern states in 2023, while Atiku won nine, Obi won two and Kwankwaso won one – Kano.

Yet, Tinubu obtained more votes across those 19 states than Atiku, whose northern total was approximately 5.06 million. Thus, winning more states does not necessarily translate into winning more votes. Electoral margins matter, just as the distribution of votes does.

For context, Tinubu’s national margin over Atiku in 2023 was 1,810,206 votes. A hypothetical 20 per cent reduction in Tinubu’s 2023 northern tally, without compensating gains elsewhere, would represent the loss of roughly 1.10 million votes.

That would be equivalent to more than 60 per cent of his previous national victory margin. This is not a forecast. It is an illustration of how sensitive the president’s re-election arithmetic could become to even a moderate shift in northern voting preferences.

Of course, registration is not turnout. Ten million additional names on the register do not automatically translate into ten million additional votes. PVC collection, voter motivation, security, accessibility and the efficiency of election-day operations remain decisive.

But the numbers leave little doubt about where the largest reservoir of electoral opportunity, and potential danger, lies.

Northern Mobilisation: A Sign of Strength or Anxiety?

The emergence of some pro-Tinubu northern political groups deserves closer examination.

On October 12, prominent northern political figures operating under the banner of Arewa for Asiwaju declared their support for the president’s re-election after visiting Vice-President Kashim Shettima at the Presidential Villa.

Former Kano State Governor, Ibrahim Shekarau, spoke for the group, which is positioning itself to challenge perceptions that the North has been neglected under the Tinubu administration.

Shettima, has therefore urged northern leaders to unite behind the president, maintaining that the region stands to benefit from another term.

There is also the Tinubu Again Movement promoted by the Minister of State for Defence and former Zamfara State governor, Bello Matawalle.

In Zamfara, figures including former governors Mahmuda Aliyu Shinkafi, Abdulaziz Yari and Ahmed Sani Yerima have also participated in political efforts supportive of Tinubu. Senator Yari is the Director-General of the campaign council for Tinubu’s re-election.

These are not inconsequential names. They represent decades of political experience, organisational networks, traditional relationships and an understanding of northern electoral behaviour. But political endorsements are one thing. The ability to deliver the electorate is another.

Indeed, the proliferation of support groups raises a question that Tinubu’s strategists should not dismiss: if the president’s standing in the North were as secure as some of his supporters insist, why has convincing the region become such an urgent political undertaking?

There is a plausible answer from the president’s camp. Early mobilisation is evidence of preparation, not necessarily weakness. Having benefited from organisation and alliance-building in previous elections, Tinubu’s supporters could reasonably argue that they are merely refusing to leave anything to chance.

Still, the existence of electoral machinery does not extinguish popular resentment, where it exists.

For many northern voters, the election may become a referendum on the cost of living, the effectiveness of security operations, the availability of jobs, the condition of agriculture and the perceived fairness of federal appointments.

The allegation that the administration has disproportionately favoured the South-West has acquired political currency in sections of the region, although it must be distinguished from an established statistical conclusion.

For example, a 2025 Federal Character Commission assessment reported 401 northern appointments against 311 southern appointments within the positions it reviewed.

That finding challenges any blanket assertion that northerners hold fewer federal positions. But it does not settle arguments over the strategic importance of individual offices, nor does it cover every category of presidential appointment.

Electoral politics frequently operates in the uncomfortable space between perception and proof. Tinubu may insist that his administration has treated the North fairly. The question is whether enough northern voters agree.

North-West: 

Where the Toughest Battle May Be Fought

The North-West is the centre of gravity of the northern contest. Its seven states of Kano, Kaduna, Katsina, Jigawa, Zamfara, Sokoto and Kebbi, have a combined 25,083,411 registered voters.

In 2023, Tinubu obtained 2.65 million votes from the zone, making it his largest northern source of support. Yet, he won only Jigawa and Zamfara. 

Atiku won Kaduna, Katsina, Sokoto and Kebbi, while Kwankwaso dominated Kano.

The region could consequently become a three-way contest in which Tinubu attempts to consolidate APC’s incumbency advantages, Atiku seeks to deepen his northern support, and the Obi-Kwankwaso ticket tries to turn Kwankwasiyya’s formidable organisation into a broader presidential movement.

Kano: The State That May Rewrite the Poll

With 6,570,276 registered voters, Kano is Nigeria’s second-largest electoral state after Lagos. Its register has increased by 648,906 since 2023 – the largest absolute gain recorded by any state.

In the last presidential election, Kwankwaso received 997,279 votes in Kano on the platform of the New Nigeria Peoples Party (NNPP). Tinubu obtained 517,341, Atiku 131,716 and Obi a mere 28,513.

The political circumstances have since changed fundamentally. Now, Obi and Kwankwaso constitute the presidential ticket of the NDC, while Governor Abba Kabir Yusuf, elected on the NNPP platform and previously identified with Kwankwasiyya, defected to the APC in January 2026.

Yusuf moved with a substantial number of state and federal lawmakers, bringing the APC an important institutional advantage. But he also left behind an unresolved political question: did the governor take the movement’s followers with him, or merely its elected officials?

That distinction could be the difference between victory and defeat in Kano.

The reconciliation of Yusuf with political interests historically opposed to Kwankwaso, including those associated with former governor Abdullahi Ganduje, has given the state’s politics the unmistakable character of a struggle over loyalty, patronage and political succession.

If Kwankwaso retains the grassroots loyalty that delivered almost one million presidential votes in 2023, his presence on Obi’s ticket could make Kano an unexpected battleground for the NDC.

But votes cannot simply be transferred from one candidate to another by political arithmetic. Some Kwankwasiyya supporters may resist Obi, while others may follow Yusuf into the APC. Atiku also has historical relationships in Kano that could become useful if the rivalry between its dominant camps deepens.

Whoever eventually wins Kano may not secure the presidency solely on that account. But losing it badly could seriously damage any candidate’s national prospects.

Kaduna: El-Rufai, Uba Sani and an Unsettled Electorate

Kaduna currently has 4,662,640 registered voters, compared with 4,335,208 in 2023. Atiku won the state in 2023 with 554,360 votes. Tinubu received 399,293, while Obi secured a substantial 294,494.

The state’s ethnic, religious and geographic divisions make it resistant to simplistic predictions.

Governor Uba Sani’s APC administration gives Tinubu an incumbent structure. But former governor Nasir El-Rufai’s political alignment with the Atiku camp introduces another powerful network.

There is also Southern Kaduna, where voting behaviour has historically reflected grievances over security, representation and communal relations.

The 2027 outcome may depend less on endorsements made in Kaduna city than on how competing parties navigate these interests across the state’s local governments.

Katsina: Buhari’s Political Homeland Without the Same Electoral Certainty

Katsina has 3,876,051 registered voters in 2026, an increase of 359,332 from 2023. But despite Buhari’s enormous influence in his home state, Tinubu lost narrowly to Atiku in 2023. Atiku obtained 489,045 votes to Tinubu’s 482,283 – a margin of only 6,762.

That narrow result makes Katsina one of the most competitive northern states.

Governor Dikko Radda and the APC establishment will seek to prevent an opposition breakthrough. Atiku, however, has already demonstrated that he can compete successfully in the state.

Security challenges affecting farming communities, the cost of agricultural inputs and rural livelihoods could prove more decisive than the sentiments of 2023.

Katsina may well be one of the clearest tests of whether the political goodwill associated with Buhari can survive as an independent advantage for Tinubu.

Jigawa: Can the APC Protect Its 2023 Advantage?

Jigawa’s register has increased from 2,351,298 in 2023 to 2,807,811 in the new register, a substantial 19.42 per cent growth. Tinubu won the state in 2023 with 421,390 votes against Atiku’s 386,587. The difference was 34,803 votes.

The APC, therefore, has an existing advantage to defend, supported by its political structures in the state.

However, the relatively narrow margin means Jigawa cannot be taken for granted. Rural economic conditions, agricultural productivity, local leadership networks and the mobilisation of newly registered voters will be critical.

An opposition gain of several tens of thousands of votes could change the result.

Zamfara: The Weight of Political Heavyweights

Zamfara has 2,224,017 registered voters, up from 1,926,870 in 2023. Tinubu won the state with 298,396 votes, ahead of Atiku’s 93,978.

The president’s support network includes the campaign DG, Yari, Matawalle, Shinkafi and other prominent politicians. Their collective experience could make Zamfara one of APC’s more promising northern battlegrounds.

Yet, the challenge here is particularly severe. For communities affected by banditry, kidnappings and displacement, politics is frequently measured by the ability to travel, farm, trade and sleep without fear.

The APC political advantage will be tested against those realities. An endorsement by a former governor may open doors. It cannot, by itself, make an insecure road safe.

Sokoto: A Narrow 2023 Defeat, an Enlarged Register

Sokoto now has 2,633,113 registered voters, compared with 2,172,056 in 2023 – a remarkable 21.23 per cent increase, the highest proportional growth among the states.

Atiku won Sokoto with 288,679 votes against Tinubu’s 285,444. Just 3,235 votes separated the candidates.

Governor Ahmed Aliyu’s APC administration and the political influence of former governor Aliyu Wamakko provide Tinubu with considerable organisational strength.

But the margin from 2023 suggests that neither side can afford complacency. A small shift in turnout, particularly in rural communities, could determine the state’s presidential winner.

Kebbi: Opposition Advantage Meets Incumbency

Kebbi has 2,309,503 registered voters. Atiku obtained 285,175 votes in 2023, defeating Tinubu, who received 248,088.

Governor Nasir Idris and the APC political establishment will seek to reverse that outcome.

However, Kebbi’s agricultural economy, insecurity in vulnerable communities and the purchasing power of rural households create important electoral pressure points.

If Atiku maintains his existing support while expanding into dissatisfied APC constituencies, Kebbi could remain favourable to him. 

This is coupled with the growing influence of a former Minister of Justice and Attorney-General of the Federation, Abubakar Malami, who is also the governorship candidate of the ADC in the state. His persona may alter some of the existing equation. 

There seems to be a shifting sentiment in his way against his perceived persecution by the Tinubu administration. This is certain to count in its small way. But a disciplined APC mobilisation effort could also make the state competitive.

The North-West, therefore, cannot reasonably be assigned wholesale to any one candidate.

Of its seven states, Kano presents the most dramatic realignment, Katsina and Sokoto were extraordinarily close in 2023, and Kaduna has developed a formidable opposition challenge.

Yet, the APC controls important state machinery and remains capable of recovering lost ground if it buckles up its chin strap. That is precisely why the zone matters so much.

North-East: 

Atiku’s Advantage, Shettima’s Burden

If the North-West is the largest electoral battlefield, the North-East may be Atiku’s strongest regional opportunity.

The six states now have a total of 13,965,475 registered voters, up from 12,542,429 in 2023. Atiku won five of the six states in the last presidential election. Tinubu won only Borno.

The vice-president’s personal electoral credibility will consequently come under particularly close scrutiny, again in 2027.

Adamawa: A Home Advantage for Atiku

Adamawa has 2,431,146 registered voters. Atiku secured 417,611 votes in the state in 2023, while Tinubu obtained 182,881. Obi received 105,648. Indeed, Tinubu secured approximately 25.01 per cent of valid votes in Adamawa, barely exceeding the constitutional spread threshold.

As Atiku’s home state, Adamawa remains a difficult territory for the APC. The president’s task will be to retain enough of his 2023 coalition to remain competitive, while Atiku seeks to widen the margin.

Bauchi: A Large Opposition Reservoir

With 3,012,547 registered voters, Bauchi is the North-East’s largest electoral state. Atiku won it in 2023 with 426,607 votes against Tinubu’s 316,694.

The PDP longstanding political structure, associated with Governor Bala Mohammed, remains an important part of the state’s political history, although the new party alignments require the opposition to rebuild or negotiate its support networks.

Tinubu is not without opportunities. His 2023 tally demonstrates that he has an existing constituency in the state. But he would need to do considerably better to overturn Atiku’s advantage.

Borno: Shettima’s Political Scrutiny

Borno has 2,765,165 registered voters, and Tinubu won the state in 2023 with 252,282 votes, compared with Atiku’s 190,921. That represented approximately 54.2 per cent of valid votes.

The result owed much to APC’s established structure, including the influence of Governor Babagana Zulum and Vice-President Shettima.

Whether that majority can be repeated is an important question, but not one that can be answered credibly by just declaring that Shettima will fail to deliver 50 per cent.

Borno’s electorate will also be judging progress against insurgency, displacement, resettlement and economic reconstruction.

As the president’s running mate, Shettima carries a dual burden: he must defend the administration’s record across the North while protecting his own state – Borno’s electoral base.

Gombe: A Steep APC Deficit

Gombe has 1,768,566 registered voters. In 2023, Atiku polled 319,123 votes against Tinubu’s 146,977. That was a substantial difference.

The APC benefits from Governor Muhammadu Inuwa Yahaya’s incumbency, but the size of the opposition’s previous advantage suggests the president will require an exceptional improvement in voter mobilisation to win the state.

Taraba: A Three-Way Competition

Taraba has 2,254,380 registered voters. Atiku won in 2023 with 189,017 votes, Obi obtained 146,315 and Tinubu received 135,165.

The vote distribution demonstrates that Taraba is more competitive than a simple North-East versus South-East electoral narrative would suggest.

Its diverse religious, ethnic and local political interests could produce a vigorous contest among the ADC, NDC and APC.

The Obi-Kwankwaso ticket may also complicate Atiku’s attempt to consolidate opposition votes.

It is worthy of mention of that Atiku did well Taraba in 2023 because certain forces like General TY Danjuma were visibly onboard. But now that it appears allegiance has switched, it is yet to be seen how that development will impact Atiku’s standing.

Yobe: Atiku’s Strong Ground, But Not an Automatic Victory

Yobe has 1,733,671 registered voters, up from 1,485,146 in 2023. Atiku obtained 198,567 votes in the previous election against Tinubu’s 151,459. His advantage is clear from the historical result.

However, the APC enjoys an incumbent political structure under Governor Mai Mala Buni, a politician with experience in party organisation.

Yobe is therefore a state in which Atiku starts from a favourable electoral precedent, but one where Tinubu still has meaningful routes to improving his performance. 

This is because some of those who made the Atiku victory possible like Governor Buni, alleged to have struck a deal, had since made up with the ruling party and and president and things may no longer stay the same.

Collectively, the North-East presents Atiku with a stronger historical foundation than the APC.

Yet, Tinubu has a vice-president from the zone, established governors and influential political networks. The eventual result will depend on whether these institutions can overcome the opposition’s demonstrated electoral strength.

North-Central: 

Where Margins May Decide Everything

The North-Central region is perhaps the most politically diverse of the three northern zones. Across Benue, Plateau, Nasarawa, Niger, Kogi and Kwara States, the latest register stands at 15,233,744 voters, excluding the FCT.

In 2023, Tinubu won four of the six states, while Obi won Plateau and Nasarawa. But a closer reading of those results reveals several vulnerabilities.

Benue: A Victory of Just 2,096 Votes

Benue has 3,057,225 registered voters. Tinubu won the state in 2023 with 310,468 votes. Obi followed with 308,372. The margin was only 2,096 votes. That is almost the definition of a competitive state.

Governor Hyacinth Alia’s APC administration, the influence of Secretary to the Government of the Federation, Senator George Akume, and internal rivalries within the governing party will all matter.

But the dominant local issue may be insecurity, especially attacks on farming communities, displacement and the agricultural economy.

The 2027 election could turn on whether the electorate believes the government has addressed these concerns.

Plateau: Can Endorsements Reverse an Obi Victory?

Plateau has 2,906,570 registered voters. Obi won with 466,272 votes in 2023. Tinubu secured 307,195 and Atiku 243,808. The result was a powerful indication that northern voting preferences are not homogeneous.

Governor Caleb Mutfwang’s participation in the APC North-Central endorsement of Tinubu illustrates the significant political realignment that has occurred since 2023.

But changing party affiliation or endorsing a candidate does not automatically change the voting preferences of the electorate.

Plateau’s communities have continuing concerns about insecurity and displacement. Their assessment of government performance may be more important than the position of political leaders.

Nasarawa: Another State Tinubu Lost

Nasarawa has 2,137,699 registered voters. Obi received 191,361 votes in 2023, defeating Tinubu, who obtained 172,922. Atiku followed with approximately 147,000.

Governor Abdullahi Sule’s APC machinery offers Tinubu an opportunity to reverse that defeat. However, Nasarawa is sufficiently diverse and competitive to resist confident predictions.

Its proximity to Abuja, expanding urban communities, traditional political structures and security concerns could produce a fragmented electoral outcome.

Niger: A Critical APC Stronghold

Niger has 2,983,476 registered voters. Tinubu won it in 2023 with 375,183 votes against Atiku’s 284,898.

Governor Mohammed Umaru Bago’s political structure and APC’s existing electoral base give the president an advantage.

However, unceasing insecurity in parts of the state and the disruption of farming activities as with other parts of the north, remain consequential issues.

Niger will be a test of whether incumbent political organisation can coexist with widespread concerns about security and livelihoods without suffering significant electoral damage.

Kogi: The APC Organisational Test

Kogi has 2,232,398 registered voters. President Tinubu secured 240,751 votes in 2023, comfortably ahead of Atiku’s 145,104.

The governing party retains substantial institutional advantages, supported by Governor Usman Ododo, his godfather, Yhaya Bello, and the established APC networks.

Nevertheless, Kogi’s ethnic diversity, the contest for local political influence and the appeal of alternative presidential tickets could affect turnout and voting patterns.

The APC begins from a position of strength, but the margin it eventually delivers may be as important as whether it wins. This does not leave out the fact that the Bello factor is not one to gloss over, given his combative disposition to election, more so that he is on the ballot.

But some former PDP leaders, who have pitched tent with Atiku and others in the PDP that are still sympthetic to him, are sure to create some balance should there be any eventuality.

Kwara: Strong APC Foundations, Emerging Competition

Kwara has 1,916,376 registered voters. Tinubu won the state in 2023 with 263,572 votes, against Atiku’s 136,909.

Governor AbdulRahman AbdulRazaq’s political structure gives the APC a significant advantage.

Yet, the involvement of prominent Kwara figures in the ADC, including its National Publicity Secretary Bolaji Abdullahi, creates an opportunity for the opposition to challenge established loyalties.

There is also the Dr. Abubakar Bukola Saraki factor, which remains constant. With the PDP fast pushing back in the run-up to 2027, the competition in Kwara is going to be a very tough one, especially that Saraki not only has name recognition but considered a thorough strategist in ‘political science’ and its operations.

The significance of Kwara, therefore, extends beyond the presidential vote. Competing ambitions over the state’s succession politics and control of local structures could influence how enthusiastically party stakeholders prosecute the national contest.

The North-Central cannot be written off by Tinubu’s opponents, nor can the president take it for granted. In a close national election, relatively small shifts in Benue, Plateau or Nasarawa could prove decisive.

The 25 Per Cent Question: A Constitutional Calculation

There is another important dimension to the 2027 election analysis. Under Section 134 of the 1999 Constitution, as amended, a presidential candidate must satisfy the relevant national vote requirement and secure at least one-quarter of votes in no fewer than two-thirds of the states.

In practical terms, the geographical spread requirement has been interpreted to mean at least 25 per cent in 24 states, with the FCT not enjoying a separate mandatory veto over the outcome.

This matters because a candidate does not have to obtain 25 per cent in every northern state to become president. Nor does winning a majority of the 19 northern states guarantee the presidency. What matters is the national vote total and the required geographical spread.

Tinubu’s 2023 performance in Adamawa illustrates why relatively small changes in the distribution of votes may acquire constitutional significance.

The president secured approximately 25.01 per cent there, an extraordinarily narrow clearance of the threshold. But the broader lesson is that electoral strategy must be based on the total number of qualifying states, rather than isolated assumptions about northern performance.

Atiku, Obi and the Problem of Opposition Arithmetic

Although Atiku possesses a substantial electoral history across northern Nigeria, his claim to the region is compounded by the emergence of Obi and Kwankwaso on a joint ticket.

INEC’s published presidential candidates’ list confirms the contestants rather than leaving their political alignments to speculation.

Tinubu is running with Shettima on the APC platform.

Atiku is contesting under the African Democratic Congress with a former Rivers State governor, Rotimi Amaechi, as his running mate.

Obi is the NDC candidate with Kwankwaso as his running mate.

Oyo State Governor Seyi Makinde is contesting on the platform of the Allied Peoples Movement, among other fringe candidates and parties.

These arrangements create a dramatically different electoral environment from 2023.

For Atiku, the advantage is that he remains the most prominent northern presidential candidate among the leading contenders, with demonstrated support in many of the region’s states.

The disadvantage is that northern voters are not obliged to vote along geographical lines. Tinubu has already proved that a southern candidate can secure a majority of his national votes from the North except that in 2027, he will run, not on promises, but his record.

Obi, meanwhile, must demonstrate that his 2023 appeal can travel beyond its strongest constituencies, particularly through Kwankwaso’s organisational network in Kano and neighbouring states.

There is a temptation to assume that the votes Obi and Kwankwaso secured separately in 2023 will simply combine in 2027. Such a calculation is attractive but potentially misleading.

Different party platforms, voter turnout, religious considerations, personal loyalties, candidate preferences and the political circumstances of the election will all affect whether that combination materialises.

Besides, Kwankwaso’s political machine is no longer operating under the same conditions as 2023, following Yusuf’s departure.

For Tinubu, there is an obvious advantage in opposition fragmentation. If Atiku and Obi compete for substantially the same pool of voters in Kano, Kaduna, Plateau or other competitive states, the APC could benefit from a divided opposition even where the majority of voters prefer change.

But this advantage is not automatic. The two opposition tickets are capable of attracting different constituencies. Their rivalry might also energise additional voters rather than merely divide existing support.

What is clear is that the battle for the North now has more than two serious political dimensions. And the president’s survival may depend, in part, on his opponents’ inability to translate their dissatisfaction with his government into one overwhelming electoral alternative.

Can the S’East Governors Contain Obi?

Although the North is central to the presidential arithmetic, the outcome will not be determined there alone. The South-East remains one of the most important regions for testing the effectiveness of political realignment.

However, Obi’s performance in the zone was not without some machinations from certain unseen hands. A former Rivers State governor, Nyesom Wike, recently shed light on this when he said the G-5, a group of governors he set up in the lead up 2023 intentionally worked for Obi to cut down Atiku’s votes.

Obi’s dominance in 2023 was extraordinary. In Anambra, he received 584,621 votes against Tinubu’s 5,111. In Enugu, Obi secured 428,740 votes against Tinubu’s 4,772. In Abia, he obtained 327,095 votes, compared with Tinubu’s 8,914.

Those were not ordinary victories. They were electoral landslides. Yet, the region’s political leadership has undergone significant changes. Some of those factors are no longer available. What is therefore likely to happen to Obi in the zone in 2027?

Governor Charles Soludo of Anambra, Obi’s home state, has openly supported Tinubu. Governor Hope Uzodinma of Imo remains a prominent figure in the APC eastern political structure, although he is fighting his own demons internally. 

Governor Peter Mbah of Enugu and other regional leaders have also become important factors in the shifting alignment around the president. Even the Abia State Governor, Alex Otti, is believed to be sympathetic to the Tinubu cause.

But there is a profound distinction between political endorsement and electoral conversion.

The challenge for Soludo, Mbah, Uzodinma and other pro-Tinubu interests is not merely to announce support for the president. It is to persuade voters who overwhelmingly rejected the APC in 2023 to reconsider. That is altogether a different undertaking.

If Tinubu substantially improves his performance in the South-East, even without winning the region, he could compensate for some northern losses, which seem to stare him in the face at the moment.

Conversely, if Obi retains his overwhelming advantage, the president would have fewer opportunities to offset significant damage elsewhere.

The 25 per cent threshold is particularly relevant here because Tinubu’s previous results in several South-East states were nowhere near that level.

The question, therefore, is not whether governors can mobilise some support for Tinubu. It is how much support they can realistically generate against an opponent, who remains deeply identified with the region’s presidential aspirations.

South-West: 

Tinubu’s Homeland No Longer a Guaranteed Sanctuary

The assumption that Tinubu’s South-West base will automatically compensate for any northern losses also requires careful examination. It’s more an unrealistic gamble.

In 2023, Tinubu won four South-West states: Ekiti, Ogun, Ondo and Oyo. He lost Lagos, his political home state to Obi, and Osun, his alleged state of origin to Atiku.

Those results make it inaccurate to suggest that his chances may be confined to one state – perhaps Ekiti – in 2027. He entered the present contest with substantial electoral support across the zone. But that support is being tested by new realities.

In Lagos, Obi defeated Tinubu by 582,454 votes to 572,606 – a margin of 9,848. The defeat was politically symbolic because Lagos had been the foundation of Tinubu’s national political influence.

If Obi can repeat that success, it would deny the president an important opportunity to rebuild his national tally.

However, Lagos’s 2027 outcome will depend on turnout, party organisation, the mobilisation of its diverse electorate and whether the political enthusiasm that powered Obi’s 2023 performance can be sustained.

Osun, however, presents a separate challenge. Tinubu lost the presidential election there in 2023, receiving 343,945 votes against Atiku’s 354,366.

More recently, Governor Ademola Adeleke won re-election in August 2026 on the Accord Party platform (after he was frustrated out of the PDP and prevented from entering the APC), securing 511,067 votes against APC’s 444,815.

The result suggests that Osun’s electorate is prepared to resist the APC even where the ruling party commits considerable resources.

But Adeleke’s governorship victory does not establish how every Osun voter will behave in a presidential election. In fact, some of the voters have started warning him to stop promising Tinubu what is arguably not in his hand.

Ogun and Ondo, too, present their own internal political complications, including rivalries among influential figures within the governing party.

In Ondo, for example, Governor Lucky Aiyedatiwa’s political relationships and the state’s internal APC alignments will help determine how effectively Tinubu’s support is mobilised. There are concerns about the governor’s true standing in the scheme of things.

In Ogun, the capacity of competing interests to work together will be important, and that’s looking already like an uphill task. The president is believed to have done a terrible job keeping Ogun APC as one house/family. He consciously made his choice, perhaps.

Yet, both states voted for Tinubu in 2023, and neither can responsibly be described as already lost or won again.

Oyo is potentially more problematic and the reason is not far-fetched. Tinubu won the state in 2023 with 449,884 votes. But Makinde, who commands substantial political influence as governor, and worked tirelessly for Tinubu is now an actual presidential candidate on the platform of APM.

His candidacy introduces the possibility of a serious contest for votes that might otherwise have gone to Tinubu or the leading opposition candidates, but will ultimately go to waste.

Whatever personal disagreements or alleged political understandings that may have existed between Makinde and Tinubu, the more important question is whether Makinde can convert his state-level popularity into a presidential vote large enough to weaken the APC.

Tinubu’s supporters may regard Makinde’s presidential ambition as unrealistic. But a candidate does not have to win the presidency to determine who loses it. Working to be a spoiler is food for thought.

That is one of the potential complications in Oyo and, by extension, the South-West. 

More importantly, Vice-President Kashim Shettima’s recent warning about internal wrangling is a note for file for the Southwest leaders, who have continued to paper the cracks.

South-South:

Atiku’s Electoral Dilemma

In the South-south exists a clinical contrast to Tinubu’s northern challenge. If the North presents a formidable political test for the president, the South-South offers an equally intriguing examination of Atiku Abubakar’s electoral relationships.

The region, once a dependable stronghold of the PDP, has undergone a remarkable political transformation, with all six governors now belonging to the ruling APC.

In Akwa Ibom, Governor Umo Eno, has abandoned the PDP for the APC, while Bayelsa’s Douye Diri has followed the same path. Delta Governor Sheriff Oborevwori has equally crossed over, taking with him former governor Ifeanyi Okowa, who was Atiku’s running mate in 2023.

In Edo and Cross River, Governors Monday Okpebholo and Bassey Otu are already established APC figures.

The implications are interesting. In 2023, Atiku won Akwa Ibom with 214,012 votes and Bayelsa with 68,818. But Peter Obi carried Delta, Edo and Cross River, polling 341,866, 331,163 and 179,917 votes, respectively.

Across these five states (excluding Rivers), Obi secured more than one million votes, against Atiku’s approximately 629,000 and Tinubu’s 568,000.

Now, with the governors united under the APC, Tinubu has acquired a significant organisational advantage. But whether that political realignment translates into corresponding electoral support remains an entirely different question.

For Atiku, the challenge is particularly delicate. His former running mate is now working within the opposing political establishment, while his new partner, Rotimi Amaechi, must help rebuild an opposition coalition in a region where the old PDP machinery has substantially changed hands.

Yet, governors do not necessarily determine presidential voting preferences, as the 2023 results in Delta, Edo and Cross River demonstrated.

The decisive question is whether these governors can transfer their political structures and influence to Tinubu, or whether voters will once again distinguish between their preferred governors and presidential candidates.

Either way, the South-South deserves attention, not merely because of its governors’ political affiliations, but because of the considerable difference between the region’s 2023 voting patterns and its present political leadership.

Rivers, the FCT and the Wike Complication

No serious analysis of the 2027 presidential election can ignore Nyesom Wike, the Minister of the Federal Capital Territory. He has declared that he will coordinate Tinubu’s campaign operations in Rivers and the FCT. He went ahead to describe himself as the commander, field operations.

His willingness to support the president while navigating complicated relationships with the PDP has made him one of the more unusual political actors of the present cycle.

Wike commands resources, political relationships and an established record of aggressive electoral organisation. But his position also comes with complications.

His longstanding conflict with Rivers Governor, Siminalayi Fubara, has created competing centres of influence. Atiku’s running mate, Rotimi Amaechi, is himself a former Rivers State governor with his own political history and network in the state.

Rivers could consequently become yet another battleground state, involving three familiar political figures whose rivalries predate the present presidential contest.

Tinubu won Rivers in 2023 with 231,591 votes. Obi received 175,071, while Atiku obtained 88,468. Those numbers demonstrate why Rivers matters to all three leading camps.

Putting the FCT in focus, Obi’s previous advantage was far more pronounced. He secured 281,717 votes against Tinubu’s 90,902.

Wike’s declaration that he will deliver the FCT for the president must therefore be judged against the scale of the electoral reversal it would require.

As with other governors, ministers and political heavyweights, Wike’s organisational influence is a relevant factor as much as a burden, but it is not an electoral result. The voters still have the final say.

The Economy and the Politics of Everyday Survival

There is a danger in reducing the coming election entirely to personalities, ethnic relationships and the disposition of political godfathers.

For millions of voters, the question may be more immediate. Can they afford food? Are their communities secure? Can they farm, travel and conduct business without fear? Have government policies improved their lives?

But Tinubu’s defenders have an economic argument to make.

The World Bank’s October 2026 Nigeria Development Update reported that real GDP grew by 4.2 per cent in the first half of 2026, compared with 3.9 per cent in the corresponding period of 2025.

Higher public revenues and improving macroeconomic fundamentals offer the administration evidence of economic progress.

But the World Bank has also stressed the need to translate these gains into jobs, poverty reduction, better public services and improved living standards.

That is where economic statistics meet electoral politics. Macroeconomic improvement may impress investors and policymakers. A household struggling with transport fares, food prices or agricultural costs may ask a different question.

Indeed, one of the government’s principal political challenges is the delay between the implementation of difficult economic reforms and the delivery of benefits that ordinary citizens can recognise.

This challenge is especially important in northern communities affected by insecurity, low household incomes and dependence on agriculture and informal trade.

The administration may be able to defend its reforms as necessary. It must also convince voters that the sacrifices are producing tangible rewards or that the ruling class is leading by personal examples.

The opposition, on the other hand, cannot rely entirely on public hardship. It must establish that its candidates possess credible and coherent alternatives.

Atiku has attempted to position himself around policy disagreements with Tinubu. Obi continues to stress governance, prudence and economic management.

But elections are not won simply by identifying problems. Voters will also judge whether those offering themselves as alternatives are capable of delivering the improvements they promise.

Traditional Institutions, Clerics and the Limits of Political Influence

The place of traditional institutions and religious leaders in northern politics is another important consideration. Emirs, district heads, influential clerics and community leaders possess networks of trust that politicians often seek to cultivate.

Their counsel can affect public attitudes, particularly in communities where religious and traditional authority remains strong. But their political preferences are not uniform, and their influence is not absolute.

Northern voters have repeatedly demonstrated an ability to distinguish between the wishes of political elites and their own electoral choices.

Kano, in particular, has a history of fierce grassroots political independence. Patronage, campaign spending and endorsements may affect mobilisation, but they cannot be assumed to purchase a predictable electoral outcome.

The same caution applies to speculation that political appointees who fear losing office may divert campaign resources for personal use, even though the practice is common in some places. Such conduct, unfortunately, can be counterproductive.

Nevertheless, campaign coordination and the reliability of political intermediaries are legitimate strategic concerns. Money spent on political mobilisation is not the same thing as votes delivered.

And the closer the election becomes, the more important that distinction may prove.

Plausible Anxiety, Not Established Forecast

One of the more dramatic suggestions circulating in political discussions is that Tinubu may struggle to secure average – say some 34 per cent of votes across the North in 2027.

It is a claim that speaks to anxiety within his political coalition and confidence among his opponents, given some of the happenings across the north of Nigeria.

But without a credible, representative opinion poll or a transparent state-by-state forecasting model, it remains a political proposition rather than a statistically established prediction.

Even the phrase “34 per cent of the North” needs definition. Does it mean 34 per cent of all registered voters, 34 per cent of votes cast or 34 per cent of valid votes? The distinctions are substantial.

What the 2023 results allow one to establish is that Tinubu’s northern strength was uneven, concentrated in particular states and dependent on margins that were sometimes surprisingly narrow.

What the 2026 registration figures establish is that the northern electorate has expanded considerably. Neither dataset, by itself, establishes how those voters intend to vote in January.

That judgment requires reliable surveys, constituency-level intelligence, turnout analysis, assessments of party organisation and continuous monitoring of campaign developments.

The most serious warning to the APC is therefore not an unsupported prediction that Tinubu will collapse to a particular percentage.

It is the possibility that an erosion of his 2023 northern vote, combined with continued opposition strength in the South-East and losses in selected southern battlegrounds, could become difficult to recover from.

Equally, the greatest danger to the opposition is the assumption that public dissatisfaction will automatically produce a united vote against the incumbent. It may not, actually.

The Final Equation

With the presidential election scheduled for January 16, 2027, the outlines of the contest are becoming clearer, albeit slowly.

Tinubu has the advantages of incumbency, access to an extensive political organisation, war chest, the support of several governors, some established northern allies and a record of successful national alliance-building.

Atiku brings a long electoral history, considerable northern recognition, experience and the advantage of having carried nine northern states in 2023.

Obi, now paired with Kwankwaso, introduces a new possibility: combining the former’s powerful southern support with the latter’s northern grassroots strength, most notably in Kano.

Makinde’s candidacy complicates the South-West, while Wike’s alignment with Tinubu, alongside the competing ambitions of Rivers politicians, adds another layer to the national calculation.

There is also the question of whether the president’s economic policies, skewed appointments and security record have created sufficient resentment to overwhelm the organisational advantages of the APC.

These are important variables, but none can yet be translated responsibly into a certain outcome. The election, therefore, remains open.

Yet, one conclusion appears increasingly difficult to dispute.

For Tinubu, 2027 is not simply about retaining his home region or persuading a collection of political heavyweights to endorse him. It is about reconstructing the northern coalition that played such a decisive role in his emergence as president.

The remarkable thing about the 2023 election was that Tinubu did not need to win most northern states to secure more northern votes than Atiku. The danger in 2027 is that this arrangement may no longer hold in the same form.

The president will need to defend his territory in Jigawa, Zamfara and Borno; remain competitive in places like Katsina and Sokoto; protect gains in Niger, Kogi, Kwara and Benue; and prevent the opposition from opening decisive margins in Kano, Kaduna, Bauchi, Gombe, Adamawa and Yobe.

He must also prepare for the possibility that Obi’s partnership with Kwankwaso could disrupt familiar electoral calculations in the region.

For Atiku, the task is to turn his northern recognition into an advantage sufficiently large to overcome APC’s incumbency and the competing appeal of the NDC.

Obi and Kwankwaso are to demonstrate that two distinct political followings can become one effective national coalition despite evident limitations. None of these is easy.

The essential lesson from the figures is unmistakable: the North remains too large, too politically diverse and too electorally consequential for any serious presidential candidate to treat as an automatic inheritance.

In 2023, the North helped to make Tinubu president. In 2027, it may determine whether he remains one.

The 2027 election battle, without doubts, is in the North. But unlike four years ago, the president must now fight it on the strength of his own record.