Battle Of Guagamela

The battle of Guagamela 333 BC was considered one of the greatest battles ever fought by Alexander the Great with the battle he completed his conquest of Persia. Battle of Gaugamela is a tactical battle, despite Alexander being at least 2-1, due to the Darius Army which is derived from Huge Manpower sourced from all the Persian Dominions.

The battle of  Gaugamela saw an end to Darius rule over Asia and this birth the expansion of Alexander into Egypt, Susa and Persepolis Taking his conquest into the far Indian Continent. Alexander’s strategy and Tactics are to be studied years after his death.

Build Up To The Battle 

Alexander had now completed the first phase of his grand strategy, securing the entire eastern Mediterranean coastline. In the summer of 333 BC, he again marched east in pursuit of Darius, reaching the Euphrates River at Thapsacus in August.

Darius’ forces under Mazaeus had held the Euphrates crossing against Alexander’s vanguard but fled on news of his approach, prudently outnumbered three thousand to one.

After crossing the Euphrates, Alexander headed north, hugging the Armenian foothills where foraging was easier and the heat less oppressive. He likely suspected, as scouts confirmed, that Darius awaited him beyond the Tigris, ready to strike his rear if he turned south. Reports also indicated the Persians planned to block his river crossing. The point Alexander chose was undefended, though the strong current still endangered his men. The army had to rest after finally crossing.

An eclipse of the moon also provoked fearful superstition among the Macedonians, threatening mutiny. But Alexander’s Egyptian seers knew the astronomy behind eclipses and human nature too. Rather than explain celestial motions, they called the eclipse a positive omen of victory, reassuring the army.

Four days after crossing the Tigris, Alexander’s scouts spotted Persian cavalry in the distance. Alexander arrayed his army for battle and advanced slowly. He soon learned this was just a small Persian advance force of about 1,000.

Leaving his army’s slow advance, Alexander rode ahead with his Royal Squadron and some light Paeonian cavalry. The Persians fled at his approach, but he pursued, killing and capturing some. From these prisoners, he gained valuable intelligence on Darius’ army strength and composition. Though diminished, the Persian Empire’s remaining military potential was still formidable.

Darius Plan

While Alexander was in Phoenicia and Egypt, Darius gathered another army, relying on the empire’s vast manpower, though numbers alone would not suffice against Alexander’s brilliant tactics. The army at Gaugamela included units previously defeated at Issus, but its composition differed radically from that routed force. Bessus led troops from Bactria, including Indians. Other contingents were Scythians, Arachotians, Hyrcanians, and Areians under Satibarzanes. There were also Persian Gulf tribesmen, Medes, Babylonians under Mazaeus, and Mesopotamian Syrians. Though total reported numbers were inflated, the force still posed a major threat.

The Persians camped at Gaugamela by the Bumodus River, 75 miles from Arbela on open ground favoring cavalry and chariots. Darius levelled the terrain and prepared traps, revealed by deserters.

The Battle Of Guagamela

Learning Darius awaited him, Alexander made camp and left baggage, followers and prisoners with a defensive ditch and stockade. That night he led his combat troops forward to confront the enemy at dawn, just seven miles away over hills, not yet visible to each other.

Around midnight, halfway there, Alexander crested the hills. The hills were likely treeless. Alexander deployed his army in battle formation and held a council of war with officers, deciding to bivouac on the spot through the night.

Taking Companion cavalry and light troops, Alexander reconnoitred Darius’ chosen battlefield below by moonlight, though keeping his distance and not engaging.

Parmenion supposedly suggested a night attack to surprise the Persians, but Alexander dismissively replied it would be a pity to steal a victory that way. Though welcoming advice, he made his own decisions. A night assault did have unpredictable risks, and while often surprising enemies with night marches, Alexander preferred fighting in daylight.

The Persians, having built no camp, anxiously stayed underarms all night fearing a night attack. The Macedonians on the hillside felt sufficiently secure to eat and rest without a fortified camp, the terrain shielding them.

From captured orders, the Persian battle lineup is known. Facing Alexander on the right were Bactrian cavalry, Scythians and Arachotians. Darius and the royal group manned the centre, standard practice. The left comprised Syrians, Mesopotamians and Gulf troops. Scythians, Bactrians and 100 scythed chariots screened the left wing. Elephants and 50 chariots stood before Darius, plus Greek mercenaries and Persians, the only reliable force against the phalanx. Alexander had about 40,000 infantry and 7,000 cavalry.

Though enveloping the left posed risks of losing contact and gaps for a counterattack, this was a calculated tactic for Alexander. His right-wing cavalry under his direct command could be recalled to reinforce the hard-pressed phalanx. Also, the phalanx operated somewhat independently until help arrived.

These tactical plans were evident at Gaugamela. Knowing the phalanx would push left, Alexander posted strong battalions on the right to avoid collapse. He also kept the Royal Squadron ready to aid the centre when needed.

To protect the vulnerable phalanx when isolated on the left, Alexander set up a rear duplicate formation to face enemies from behind if encircled. He also enabled last-minute extension or closing of phalanx ranks, screening the flanks with archers while doing so.

Accounts suggest Alexander overslept that morning and officers hesitated to wake him. In any case, fighting began mid-morning as the armies slowly advanced in line, each side making cautious moves.

The wide plain fully favoured Darius, allowing the use of superior numbers. As always seeking the flanking edge, Alexander continually led cavalry right, matched thereby Bactrians and Scythians, pulling both sides from the levelled central ground meant for Darius’ chariots.

Darius then ordered his larger left wing to contain Alexander’s lateral movement. They obeyed, obstructing Alexander, who responded by sending Mercenary Cavalry under Menidas to attack their middle. Scythians and Bactrians counterattacked but were temporarily routed when Alexander committed Paeonian horse and other mercenaries. However, Bactrian reserves arrived, rallying the fugitives and restoring their position in evenly-contested fighting where Alexander’s men suffered heavy losses against the Scythians’ heavy armour. Still, waves of Macedonians persisted, ultimately shattering the enemy. Alexander may have feinted to catch them re-forming when the response was difficult.

Darius next deployed his scythed chariots, but like at Cunaxa, they proved ineffective. Archers and javelin men let them pass then attacked from behind. Some seized reins and dragged down drivers. Surviving chariots were rounded up. Though other accounts describe gruesome scythe effects, at Gaugamela the chariots did not decisively influence events. Despite their aura, the infantry had surpassed them since the Bronze Age. They remained flashy but obsolete.

As the ineffective chariots withdrew, Darius made another attempt to contain Alexander’s leftward cavalry drive, dispatching Persian horse from his centre. This left a fatal gap in the Persian middle that likely presented the opportunity Alexander had waited for. He swiftly changed direction and charged left into the gap with his central infantry, heading straight for Darius’ position, soon followed by the phalangites.

Darius again fled, costing his army’s will like at Issus. Meanwhile, Alexander’s cavalry commander Aretas had shattered the Persians on the right, achieving total victory there. Pursuit and slaughter followed.

But on the Macedonian left and centre, events differed. Only Alexander’s far-right phalangites could follow his bold central attack. The rest halted to support their embroiled left-wing comrades. A gap opened in the phalanx where Persian cavalry and Indians poured through, riding deep behind enemy lines to raid the distant baggage camp, slaughtering the guards and liberating Persian prisoners to join the attack.

Other Persian cavalry fanning out from the phalanx gap now threatened Parmenion’s left wing from the rear and flank, coinciding with an encircling Persian right-wing cavalry move. Parmenion urgently messaged Alexander for aid.

The rear phalanx quickly about-faced, sped back to save the camp and posed a threat to the Persian horse attacking Parmenion. As at Issus, Alexander’s discipline allowed withdrawing from pursuit to reinforce Parmenion. But confusion followed. Alexander collided with fleeing central Persian cavalry and became tied up in a chaotic melee, delaying his support. Eventually, the Companions dispersed them, driving survivors from the field.

Ultimate Victory 

Alexander’s and the rear phalanx’s relief removed threats to Parmenion’s left. The Macedonian horse could now counterattack against Mazaeus’ Persian right-wing cavalry. Mazaeus had pressed forward and lost contact with Darius, unaware of his flight and the Persian collapse elsewhere. This news made Mazaeus waver, slowing his attack. The risk of encirclement now endangered him as the Macedonians held the centre and could soon wheel his way. Moreover, the diverse Persian host lacked the motivation to continue without the king.

By the time Alexander reached Parmenion, the most danger was past. With the heroic Thessalians now taking the offensive and driving back Mazaeus’ troops, Alexander no longer needed to attack Mazaeus but resumed pursuing Darius, his whole army following the routed enemy.

The Persians maintained their flight with Alexander chasing them until dusk, crossing the Lycus River and resting until midnight before renewing their pursuit. Darius never stopped. Meanwhile, Parmenion occupied the Persian camp not far behind Alexander. The Macedonians saved time by killing or routing the raiders, and seized the Persian baggage train’s riches, compensating for any losses.

Alexander hoped to capture Darius in Arbela 75 miles east, but he had fled again, abandoning treasures and possessions including his chariot and weapons as at Issus. As before, Alexander prioritized supporting his troops over capturing Darius immediately. His caution was warranted to avoid leaving the enemy controlling the field.

Ancient casualty figures seem exaggerated – 100 Macedonian soldiers but over 1,000 horses lost, and Persian losses numbered in the hundreds of thousands, mostly occurring during the pursuit.

At Gaugamela, the wide plain negated Darius’ superior numbers. He reacted to Alexander’s flanking as at Issus but Alexander persistently hammered the Persian cavalry sent to envelop him. Whether an adapted flanking manoeuvre or feint, it was audacious. When Darius’ centre weakened guarding against Macedonian cavalry, Alexander swiftly exploited the gap with a bold strike. His characteristic seizing of fleeting advantage required being at the very heart of events. Again he led the men to victory.

Darius correctly guessed Alexander would next take Babylon, Susa and Persepolis, fleeing northeast into Media’s mountains.